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Abstract
We investigate the 3-player quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma with a certain strategic
space, a particular Nash equilibrium that can remove the original dilemma is found.
Based on this equilibrium, we show that the game is enhanced by the entanglement
of its initial state.
Introduction
Game theory is a very useful and important branch of mathematics due to
its broad applications in economics, social science and biology[1]. Recently,
physicists specializing in quantum information theory are very interested in
the investigation of extending classical games into the quantum domain[2].
Current researches have led new sights into the nature of information[3,4,5],
opening a new range of potential applications[6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15]. Quan-
tum games are now found helpful in developing new quantum algorithms[6,7],
and quantum strategies are found helpful in solving problems in classical
games[8,9,10]. Investigations on evolutionary procedure of quantum games
are also presented[11]. Although quantum games are mostly explored theo-
retically, the quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma has just been successfully realized
experimentally[12].
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Fig. 1. The payoff matrix of the 3-player Prisoners’ Dilemma. The first entry in the
parenthesis denotes the payoff of Alice, the second number denotes the payoff of
Bob, and the third number denotes the payoff of Colin — see in Ref[13].
All the above works focus on 2-player quantum games (within a 2-qubit sys-
tem). However, S. C. Benjamin and P. M. Hayden recently presented the first
study of quantum games with more than two players[14,15]. They showed
that such games can exhibit certain forms of pure quantum equilibrium that
have no analog in classical games, or even in 2-player quantum games. They
also proposed a physical model which is suitable for multiplayer quantum
game, and based their work on maximally entangled states. In this paper, we
quantize the 3-player version of the Prisoners’ Dilemma[19], which is a fa-
mous multiplayer game in classical game theory, basing on the physical model
proposed in Ref. [14,15]. We find a Nash equilibrium that can remove the
dilemma in the classical game when the game’s state is maximally entangled.
This particular Nash equilibrium remains to be a Nash equilibrium even for
the non-maximally entangled cases. Furthermore, the payoffs at this equilib-
rium increase monotonously when the amount of the game’s entanglement
increases. Thus the quantum 3-player Prisoners’ Dilemma is enhanced by the
entanglement of its initial state.
1 3-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a famous, none zero-sum game which illustrates a
conflict between individual and group rationality. The dilemma in this game
was first proposed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950. Later on, Al-
bert Tucker made “the Prisoner’s Dilemma” as the title of this game who wants
the game to be more popular. After it was published, the dilemma attracted
widespread attention in a variety of disciplines. By far, 2-player Prisoner’s
Dilemma has drawn interests of physicists specializing in quantum informa-
tion theory. The investigation of the 2-player quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma is
presented[2]. In this paper, we generalize this game to involve 3 players, and
investigate the quantization in a 3-qubit system.
The scenario of the 3-player Prisoner’s Dilemma is as the following hypothet-
ical situation: three players — Alice, Bob and Colin were arrested under the
suspicion of robbing the bank. They were placed in isolated cells without a
2
chance to communicate with each other. However, the police does not have
sufficient proof to have them convicted. Since each of them cared much more
about their personal freedom than about the welfare of their accomplice, a
clever policeman makes the following offer to the three players: Each of them
may choose to confess or remain silent. For convenience, we denote choosing
to confess by strategy D (defect), and choosing to remain silent by strategy C
(cooperate). If they all choose D (defect), each of them will get payoff 1; if the
players all resort to strategy C (cooperate), each of them will get payoff 3; if
one of the players choose D but the other two choose C, 5 is the payoff for the
former and 2 for the latter two; if one of the players choose C while the other
two adopt D, 0 is payoff for the former and 4 for the latter two. This situation
and its different outcomes can be summarized by Fig. 1. We can see that strat-
egy D is the dominant strategy for each player, i.e. whatever other players do,
each is better off defect than cooperate. In terms of game theory, (D,D,D) is
the unique Nash equilibrium of the game, with payoff (1, 1, 1). Unilateral devi-
ation from this equilibrium will decrease individual payoff. Since each of them
is a completely rational player, the game will definitely end in the situation
that all players choose strategy D. However, we can see that (C,C, C) can
yield payoff (3, 3, 3), much higher than (1, 1, 1) in the situation of (D,D,D).
In game theory, (C,C, C) is a Pareto Optimal, which is regarded as the most
efficient strategic profile of a game. Unfortunately, rational reasoning forces
each player to defect, and therefore the game will end in (D,D,D) rather than
(C,C, C). This is an instance of that optimizing the outcome for a subsystem
will in general not optimizing the outcome for the system as a whole, and is
exactly what called a dilemma in this game.
2 Physical Model for the Quantum Game
In this paper, we make use of the physical model proposed in Ref. [14,15] —
see in Fig. 2. In the board of this model, each player is sent a 2-state quantum
system (a qubit) and they can locally manipulate their individual qubit. The
possible outcomes of the classical strategies “Cooperate” and “Defect” are as-
signed to two bases |0〉 and |1〉 in the Hilbert space of a single qubit. The state
of the game is then described by a state in the tensor product space of the three
qubits, spanned by the bases |σ〉
∣∣∣σ′〉 ∣∣∣σ′′〉 = ∣∣∣σσ′σ′′〉 (σ, σ′ , σ′′ ∈ {0, 1}), where
the first, second and third entries refer to Alice’s, Bob’s and Colin’s qubits re-
spectively. The initial state of the game is denoted by |ψi〉 = Jˆ |000〉, where
Jˆ = exp
{
iγ
2
σˆx ⊗ σˆx ⊗ σˆx
}
(0 6 γ 6 π/2) is the entangling gate of the game
and is known to all of the players. In fact, γ could be considered as a measure
for the game’s entanglement. Strategic move of Alice (Bob or Colin) is denoted
by unitary operator UˆA (UˆB or UˆC), which are chosen from a certain strate-
gic space S. Since the strategic moves of different players are independent,
3
JUA
y i y ifi
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
JUB
UC
i0
i0
i0
Fig. 2. The physics model of a 3-player quantum game.
one player’s operators only operate on his/her individual qubit. Therefore the
strategic space S should be some subset of the group of unitary 2×2 matrices.
We can set the strategic space to be the following 2-parameter subset of SU(2)
(for the choose of different strategic spaces, see Ref. [16,17,18]),
Uˆ (θ, ϕ) =

 cos θ/2 eiϕ sin θ/2
−e−iϕ sin θ/2 cos θ/2

 (1)
with 0 6 θ 6 π and 0 6 ϕ 6 π/2. To be specific, Uˆ (0, 0) is the identity
operator Iˆ which corresponds to “Cooperate”, and Uˆ (π, π/2) = iσˆx, which
is equivalent to the bit-flipping operator, corresponds to “Defect”. It is easy
to check that Jˆ commutes with any operator consisting of iσˆx and Iˆ acting
on different qubits, hence the classical Prisoners’ Dilemma could be faithfully
recovered by the quantum game.
Having executed their strategic moves, the players forward their qubits to gate
Jˆ+, after which the game’s final state prior to the measurement can be written
as
|ψf 〉 =
∣∣∣ψf (UˆA, UˆB, UˆC)〉
= Jˆ+
(
UˆA ⊗ UˆB ⊗ UˆC
)
Jˆ |000〉 . (2)
The succeeding measurement yields a particular result with a certain proba-
bility. Therefore the payoff for Alice should be the expected payoff
$A = 5PDCC + 4 (PDDC + PDCD) + 3PCCC
+ 2 (PCCD + PCDC) + 1PDDD + 0PCDD (3)
where Pσσ′σ′′ =
∣∣∣〈σσ′σ′′ ∣∣∣ ψf 〉∣∣∣2 is the probability that |ψf 〉 collapses into∣∣∣σσ′σ′′〉. Payoff functions of Bob and Colin can be obtained from similar an-
alyzing.
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3 Nash Equilibrium In The Quantum Game
We now turn our attention to the Nash equilibrium of the 3-player quantum
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
If the measure of the game’s entanglement is γ = 0, the game is separable,
i.e. at each instance the state of the game is separable. We find that all the
eight strategic profiles consisting of Uˆ (π, π/2) = iσˆx and Uˆ (π, 0) = iσˆy are
Nash equilibria. However this situation of multiple equilibria is trivial. For
any profile of Nash equilibrium of the separable game, because iσˆx |0〉 = i |1〉
and iσˆy |0〉 = − |1〉, the final state |ψf 〉 = − (−i)
n |1〉 |1〉 |1〉, where n denotes
the number of players who adopts Uˆ (π, π/2) = iσˆx. According to the payoff
functions, each player receives payoff 1. Hence iσˆx and iσˆy have the same
effect to the payoffs. Therefore all these Nash Equilibria are equivalent to the
classical strategic profile (D,D,D). Indeed, any quantum strategy Uˆ (θ, ϕ) is
equivalent to the classical mixed strategy “C with probability cos2 θ/2 and D
with probability sin2 θ/2”, because Uˆ (θ, ϕ) |0〉 = cos θ/2 |0〉 − e−iϕ sin θ/2 |1〉
and hence the measurement gives |0〉 with probability cos2 θ/2 and |1〉 with
probability sin2 θ/2. Therefore we conclude that the separable quantum game
does not exceed the classical game.
Although the separable quantum game does not exhibit any quantum advan-
tages, the maximally entangled game does. It can be proved that the strategic
profile iσˆx ⊗ iσˆx ⊗ iσˆx is no longer the Nash equilibrium. In fact,
$A
(
Uˆ (θ, ϕ) , iσˆx, iσˆx
)
=
(
1 + 2 cos2 ϕ
)
sin2
θ
2
6 3 = $A (iσˆy, iσˆx, iσˆx) . (4)
Hence iσˆx is no longer the best response for one player when the other two
choose iσˆx. Besides, we can also get that
$A
(
Uˆ (θ, ϕ) , iσˆx, iσˆy
)
=
1
2
[
7 + 3 cos θ − 2 sin2
θ
2
cos 2ϕ
]
6 5 = $A
(
Iˆ , iσˆx, iσˆy
)
.
(5)
Therefore, considering the symmetry of the game, we obtain that among the
eight Nash equilibria in the separable game (consisting of iσˆx and iσˆy), any one
containing iσˆx is not a Nash equilibrium for the maximally entangled game.
However, the particular one iσˆy ⊗ iσˆy ⊗ iσˆy remains to be a Nash equilibrium
with
$A (iσˆy , iσˆy, iσˆy) = $B (iσˆy , iσˆy, iσˆy) = $C (iσˆy, iσˆy, iσˆy) = 3. (6)
Indeed, for γ = π/2, with equation (3) and equation (6), we have
$A
(
Uˆ (θ, ϕ) , iσˆy, iσˆy
)
=
(
1 + 2 cos2 ϕ
)
sin2
θ
2
6 3 = $A (iσˆy, iσˆy, iσˆy) (7)
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Fig. 3. The payoff plot as a function of γ when all the players resort to Nash
Equilibrium, iσy ⊗ iσy ⊗ iσy. From this figure we can see that the payoffs of the
players are the same monotonuous increasing function of γ.
for all θ ∈ [0, π] and ϕ ∈ [0, π/2]. Analogously
$B
(
iσˆy, Uˆ (θ, ϕ) , iσˆy
)
6 $B (iσˆy, iσˆy, iσˆy)
$C
(
iσˆy, iσˆy, Uˆ (θ, ϕ)
)
6 $C (iσˆy, iσˆy, iσˆy) (8)
Hence, no player can improve his individual payoff by unilaterally deviating
from strategy iσˆy , i.e. (iσˆy, iσˆy, iσˆy) is a Nash equilibrium. It is interesting
to see that the payoffs for the players are $A = $B = $C = 3, which is
the best payoffs for them while remaining the symmetry of the game. So the
strategic profile (iσˆy, iσˆy, iσˆy) has the property of Pareto Optimal. By allowing
the players to adopt quantum strategies, the dilemma in the classical game is
completely removed when the game is maximally entangled.
4 The Situation of Non-maximal Entanglement
It is well known that entanglement plays an important role in quantum in-
formation processing and is viewed as the essential resource for transmitting
quantum information. In the preceding section, we have investigated the max-
imally entangled game. In that case, we find a particular Nash equilibrium
(iσˆy, iσˆy, iσˆy), which has the property of Pareto optimal. Because of the key
role of entanglement in quantum information, it will be interesting to investi-
gate how the properties of the quantum game relate to its entanglement.
The novel feature of iσˆy ⊗ iσˆy ⊗ iσˆy is that this strategic profile remains to be
a Nash equilibrium for any γ ∈ [0, π/2] . The proof runs as follows. Assume
Bob and Colin adopt iσˆy as their strategies, the payoff function of Alice with
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respect to her strategy Uˆ (θ, ϕ) is
$A
(
Uˆ (θ, ϕ) , iσˆy, iσˆy
)
=
(
1 + 2 cos2 ϕ sin2 γ
)
sin2
θ
2
6 1 + 2 sin2 γ = $A (iσˆy, iσˆy, iσˆy) . (9)
Hence, iσˆy is her best reply provided that her opponents all choose iσˆy. Since
the game is symmetric, the same holds for Bob and Colin. Therefore, no matter
what the amount of the game’s entanglement is, iσˆy ⊗ iσˆy ⊗ iσˆy is always a
Nash equilibrium for the game. It can be seen that the payoff of the players is a
monotonously increasing function with respect to amount of the entanglement,
$A (iσˆy, iσˆy, iσˆy) = $B (iσˆy, iσˆy, iσˆy) = $C (iσˆy, iσˆy, iσˆy) = 1 + 2 sin
2 γ (10)
Fig. 3 illustrates how the payoffs depend on the amount of entanglement when
the players all resort to Nash equilibrium. From this figure, we can see that
entanglement dominates and enhances the property of the game: the payoffs
of the players are the same monotonously increasing function of the amount of
the game’s entanglement. The strategic profile iσˆy⊗ iσˆy⊗ iσˆy is always a Nash
equilibrium of the game no matter what the entanglement is. The dilemma
could be completely removed when the measure of game’s entanglement γ
increases to its maximum π/2.
5 Conclusion
As multipartite physical systems tend to be complex, multiplayer quantum
games may be more complicated and interesting than 2-player games[13]. In
this paper, we present a symmetric quantum Nash equilibrium, iσˆy⊗iσˆy⊗iσˆy ,
for the quantum 3-player Prisoners’ Dilemma with certain strategic space.
The novel feature of this equilibrium is that it is the only surviving Nash
equilibrium among those for the separable game when the game is maximally
entangled, and is the Pareto optimal at the same time. The dilemma in the
classical game could be completely removed if all the players resort to this
equilibrium. What is more interesting is that it remains to be a Nash equilib-
rium whatever the amount of entanglement is, and the payoffs for the players
increase monotonously as the amount of entanglement increases. It seems that
in a multiplayer quantum game, not only quantum strategies have superior
performance over its classical counterpart, but also entanglement can enhance
the property of the game. However we should point out that, in this paper we
do not present other Nash equilibria (if exist) for the quantum 3-player Pris-
oners’ Dilemma, besides iσˆy⊗ iσˆy⊗ iσˆy . Finding all the Nash equilibrium is an
interesting but a little complicated task, and deserves further investigation in
future works. Another thing we should point out is that our work is based on
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a restricted strategic space. As stated in Ref. [8,16], the most general strategic
space of the players could be all of the trace-preserving, completely-positive
maps. With this strategic space, it has been demonstrated that if the amount
of entanglement reaches it maximum, there would be no pure strategic Nash
Equilibrium in the 2-player Prisoner’s Dilemma[16]. While maximally entan-
gled multiplayer quantum games can have certain forms of pure quantum equi-
librium that have no analog in classical games, or even in 2-player quantum
games[14,15]. Especially when the entanglement varies, the game may have
multiple or even asymmetric Nash equilibria, and possibly other fascinating
properties similar to that in Ref [9]. What singularity do multiplayer quantum
games have remain open in this paper and is interesting for further investi-
gation. We hope these works could also contribute to better understanding of
multipartite quantum information processing.
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China (Grants. No. 10075041 and No. 10075044) and Chinese Academy of
Science.
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